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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants were charged by information, filed on 5 June 
1980, for violating provisions of Section 76-5-405 (1) (a) (ii), 
U.C.A. (1953), to wit: engaging in a sexual act involving the 
genitals of one person and the mouth of another, without the 
consent of the victim, DENNIS FRAZIER, compelling submission to 
the said sexual act by the threat of death or serious bodily 
injury to be inflicted imminently on the said DENNIS FRAZIER. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
- -- --- ---
Appellants were found not guilty of violating Section 
76-5-405 (1) (a) (ii), but were found guilty of violating Section 
76-5-403(2), forcible sodomy, a lessor included offense. Both 
Appellants were subsequently committed to the Utah State Prison 
to serve terms of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully seek reversal of the lower Court's 
judgment or, alternatively, an order remanding the case for a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
----
Appellants' case was submitted to the jury with the Court's 
instructions and three sets of acceptable verdict. Those 
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instructions and verdicts allowed that the jury might find 
Appellants either guilty of aggravated sexual assault, guilty of 
forcible sodomy, or not guilty (see pages 47, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 
and 57 of the Record on Appeal) . 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: Appellants were entitled to have the jury instructed 
relative to all lessor included offenses not 
necessarily precluded by the evidence. 
Amendment number XIV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the 
United States provides, inter alia, that no State shall "deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." Likewise the Constitution of Utah in 
Article I, Section 2 declares that governmental powers are "for 
(the people's) equal protection" and in Article I, Section 7 that 
"no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." Section 76-1-402(4) U.C.A. (1953), 
directs that "the Court shall not be obligated to charge the jury 
with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational 
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense." 
Appellants assert that there existed such a rational basis 
to believe they were not guilty of the offense charged but guilty 
of certain lessor included offenses that were not offered to the 
jury; that the Court was obligated to instruct the jury with 
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respect to those included offenses; that they were, therefore, 
denied equal protection and due process of the law in that their 
convictions were entered in violation of Section 76-1-402(4). 
The Court has many times passed on a defendant's right to 
have lessor included offenses offered to the jury: 
One of the fundamental principles in regard to the 
submission of issues to the juries is that where the parties 
so request, they are entitled to have instructions given 
upon their theory of the case; and this includes on lessor 
offenses if any reasonable view of the evidence would 
support such a verdict. This is in accord with the 
authorities generally and with the adjudications of this 
Court, as stated in a number of cases dealing with 
instructing on lessor offenses. State v. Gillian, 463 P2d 
8ll (1970). See State v. Castillo, 457 P2d 618; State v. 
Hyams, 230 P 349 (1924); State v. Thompson, 170 P2d 153 
(1946); Stevenson v. United States, 16 S.Ct. 839; State v. 
Johnson, 185 P2d 738 (1947). 
We have held that each party is entitled to have his theory 
of the case which is supported by competent evidence 
submitted to the jury by appropriate instructions; and the 
failure to present for the jury's consideration a party's 
theory by appropriate instructions is reversible error. 
State v. Newton, 144 P2d 290 (1943). 
If in a case of different degrees of charged greater 
offense, there is sufficient evidence to submit the case to 
the jury of the charged greater offense, I do not see 
wherein it is the perogative of the Court to direct the jury 
of what degree only the jury may find the defendant guilty, 
or to direct them that, if they do not find him guilty of 
the charged greater offense they must acquit him. To permit 
the Court to do that is to permit it to be the judge of the 
facts. State v. Fergfuson, 279 P.55 (1929). 
The well established general rule, that the jury should be 
instructed on lessor included offenses when such a 
conviction would be warranted by any reasonable view of the 
evidence, is in accord with and supported by our statutory 
law. State v. Close, 499 P2d 287 (1972). 
Each party is, however, entitled to have the jury instructed 
on the law applicable to its theory of the case if there is 
any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it. State 
v. Torres, 619 P2d 694 (1980). 
- 3 -
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.... if there be any evidence, however slight, on any 
reasonable theory of the case under which the Defendant 
might be convicted of a lessor included offense, the Court 
must, if requested, give an appropriate instruction. State 
v. Dougherty, 550 P2d 175 (1976). ~~-
Instructions on the lessor offense may be given because all 
elements of the lessor offense have been proven. Such an 
instruction may properly be refused if the prosecution has 
met its burden of proof on the greater offense, and there is 
no evidence tending to reduce the greater offense. If there 
be any evdience, however slight, on any reasonable theory of 
the case under which Defendant might be convicted of-a 
lessor included offense, the trial Court must, if requested, 
give an appropriate instruction. (Emphasis added by the 
Court). State v. Chesnut, 621 P2d 1228 (1980). 
Other states take identical positions regarding instructing 
relative to lessor included offenses. See, for example, Bowers 
v. People, 617 P2d 560 (1980) at 562, and People v. Glenn, 615 
P2d 700 (1980) at 705, both Colorado cases; and State v. 
Jimerson, 618 P2d 1027 (1980) at 1029, a Washington state case. 
The law seems to be, then, that if any evidence is presented 
that would cause reasonable jurors to convict on a lessor offense 
and acquit on the greater, the jury must be instructed relative 
to those lessor included offenses. Appellants claim such 
evidence was introduced so that instructions on lessor included 
offenses were required. This brief will argue for the existence 
of such evidence in Point III, below. 
POINT II: This Court may review the trial Court's refusal to 
instruct on all lessor included offenses whether or 
not trial counsel objected thereto. 
At the trial of this matter, Defendant ELLIOTT was 
represented by Mr. CASEY CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.; Defendant CLAYTON was 
- 4 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
represented by Mr. STEPHEN R. MADSEN, ESQ. (see pages 34, 35, 36, 
37, 38, and 39 of the Record on Appeal); Defendant ELLIOTT 
apparently did not file a written request. Part of Defendant 
CLAYTON'S request was an instruction on the lessor included 
offense of assault by a prisoner (see page 37 of the Record on 
Appeal) . 
The Minute Entry designated as "Trial" indicates that on the 
second day of the trial, prior to reading the instructions to the 
jury, the Court met with counsel in chambers relative to jury 
instructions (see page 60 of the Record on Appeal). The 
transcript of the trial, at Page 237, line 1, indicates that 
Defendant ELLIOTT, through his counsel, objected to the Court's 
refusal to instruct on the lessor included offenses of assault 
and aggravated assault. 
Appellants claim there is authority for this Court to 
exercise its discretion and assign error to the trial Court's 
instructions if they omitted charges relative to additional 
lessor included offenses for which evidence would support 
convictions. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, No. 51, Instructions 
to Jury: Objections, prescribes, "No party may assign as error 
the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a 
party must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and 
the grounds to his objections. Notwithstanding the foregoing 
requirement, the appellate Court, in its discretion and in the 
interest of justice, may review the giving or failure to give an 
- 5 -
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instruction. Similarly the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
19-Instructions, states in paragraph (c) "No party may assign as 
error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly 
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be 
assigned to instructions in order to avoid manifest injustice." 
Case law also supports such assignment of error by a reviewing 
Court, absent counsel's failure to request instructions at time 
of trial: 
in capital cases and in cases of grave and serious 
charged offenses and convictions of long terms of 
imprisonment, cases involving the life and liberty of the 
citizen, we think that when palpable error is made to appear 
on the face of the record and to the manifest prejudice of 
the accused, the Court has the power to notice such error 
and to correct the same, though no formal exception was 
taken to the ruling. August v. U.S., 257 F. 388 (1918). 
Speaking of this rule that no review will be had of instructions 
or refusals to instruct where no exception was taken, this Court 
has reached the same conclusion as did the above Federal Court 
ruling: 
Such rule, however, is not uniform as to all errors so 
committed. In many jurisdictions there are well recognized 
exceptions to the general rule, especially in criminal cases 
involving capital offenses or other grave and serious 
offenses of long term imprisonment, and sometimes has even 
been applied in civil cases, when palpable error on the face 
of the record involved violations of fundamental rights and 
privileges of manifest prejudice to the party aggrieved. 
State v. Cobo, 60 P2d 592 (1936). 
The reason the rule is sometimes relaxed to allow appellate 
review where no objection or exceptions were taken at the trial 
level is because instructions on lessor included offenses are 
fundamental to the Defendant's case. Because those instructions 
- 6 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
are vital to the Defendant, the trial Court should alert the jury 
if even on its own motion: 
This Court in a number of decisions has affirmed the rule 
above stated requiring the submission of lessor included 
offenses when the evidence and circumstances so justify, and 
has gone further in indicating that even in the absence of 
an appropriate objection, if it is clear that the interests 
of justice so require, that the Court should instruct on 
included offenses. State v. Close, supra. 
The Kansas Supreme Court spoke similarly of instructions on 
lessor included offenses saying: 
Such an instruction is required even though such 
instructions have not been requested or have been objected 
to. State v. Mark's, 602 P2d 1344 (1979). 
The Arizona appellate Court ruled: 
Where the matter is vital to the rights of a defendant, 
however, the trial judge is required to instruct on its own 
motion, even if the Defendant fails to request him to do so. 
State v. Baker, 617 P2d 39 (1980). 
Appellants assert their case meets all criteria for this 
Court to exercise its discretion to review the trial Court's 
omission of certain lessor included offenses in its instructions 
to the jury: 1) Rules 51 and 19(c) vest this Court with such 
authority, 2) case law indicates such instructions are 
fundamental and vital to Appellants' rights to due process, 3) 
Appellants were charged with violating a felony of the first 
degree--a grave and serious offense, 4) Appellants were convicted 
of a felony of the second degree--a conviction of long term 
imprisonment, 5) the Trial Court did not act on its own to 
adequately instruct the jury, 6) the evidence supports 
convictions on various lessor included offenses, as will be shown 
in Point III, below. 
- 7 -
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POINT III: Appellants were entitled to have the jury instructed 
that a verdict could have been returned on any of the 
following lessor included offenses: 
--Section 76-5-103.5, U.C.A. (1953), aggravated 
assault by a prisoner, a 2nd degree felonyi 
--Section 76-5-403 (2), U.C.A. (1953), forcible 
sodomy, a 2nd degree felonyi 
--Section 76-4-101, U.C.A. (1953), attempted forcible 
sodomy, a 3rd degree felonyi 
--Section 76-5-404(1), U.C.A. (1953), forcible sexual 
abuse, a 3rd degree felonyi 
--Section 76-5-102.5, U.C.A. (1953), assault by a 
prisoner, a 3rd degree felony. 
As shown in Point I, instructions on lessor included 
offenses must be given if any evidence is produced at trial which 
would support a conviction on such included offensei such 
instructions may be omitted only if ~ evidence is produced to 
support a conviction on the included offense. 
It is conceded that the evidence produced at the trial of 
this matter is consistent insofar as it establishes that both 
Defendants were inmates of the Utah County Jail on 4 May 1980, 
the date of the incident for which they were tried. The evidence 
also consistently establishes that on that date both Defendants 
made unlawful physical contact with their victim, repeatedly, 
without his consent, and against his efforts. But much of the 
rest of the evidence is conflicting. 
- 8 -
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Some of the evidence indicated that the Defendants "used a 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury" 
or threatened their victim with "death or serious bodily injury 
to be inflicted imminently." See witness DENNIS FRAZIER'S 
testimony at: 
page 28, line 23 to page 29, line 12; 
page 43, line 1 to page 43, line 12; 
page 47, line 20 to page 48, line 6; 
page 70, line 14 to page 72, line 8; 
page 73, line 9 to page 73, line 27; 
See also witness CARL HOWE'S testimony at: 
page 144, line 19 to page 144, line 29. 
But other evidence did not substantiate the contention that 
Defendants used or threatened death or serious bodily injury. 
See WILLIAM CLAYTON'S testimony at: 
page 161, line 21 to page 161, line 28; 
page 164, line 21 to page 164, line 29. 
See LARRY ELLIOTT'S testimony at: 
page 177, line 4 to page 177, line 10; 
page 181, line 6 to page 181, line 18; 
page 185, line 1 to page 186, line 10; 
page 186, line 14 to page 187, line 12; 
Some of the testimony seemed to establish that on one or 
more occasions one or both of the Defendants touched genitals to 
the mouth of DENNIS FRAZIER. See DENNIS FRAZIER'S testimony at: 
page 32, line 10 to page 32, line 23; 
page 34, line 9 to page 34, line 16; 
page 37, line 24 to page 38, line 13; 
page 45, line 24 to page 46, line 4. 
BRAD PERRY testified similarly: 
page 111, line 9 to page 111, line 11; 
page 118, lines 24 to 29. 
However, other witnesses testified that, while the 
Defendants displayed their genitals, there was not the contact 
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between them and the victim's mouth necessary to constitute the 
offense of sodomy. See MICHAEL TAYLOR'S testimony at: 
page 98, line 30 to page 99, line 12; 
page 100, lines 5 through 8. 
See CARL HOWE'S testimony at: 
page 146,line 7 to page 146, line 13; 
page 146, line 18 to page 146, line 21; 
page 147, line 4 to page 147, line 9; 
page 150, line 1 to page 150, line 13; 
page 151, line 1 to page 151, line 15. 
See WILLIAM CLAYTON'S testimony at: 
page 158, lines 18 through 22; 
page 159, lines 17 through 22; 
page 172, line 29 to page 173, line 7. 
See LARRY ELLIOTT'S testimony at: 
page 176, line 25 to page 177, line 3; 
page 177, lines 11 through 15; 
page 184, lines 7 through 18. 
Given the foregoing conflicting testimony, the jury could 
have rationally found either for or against the existence of 
threats of imminent death or serious bodily injury. In fact, the 
jury did return a verdict that found such a threat did not 
exist. Likewise, the jury could have concluded rationally either 
way on the issue of whether or not there was a touching of the 
Defendants' genitals with the victim's mouth. However, the 
instructions and verdict blanks given to the jury at the trial 
removed from them the option of returning a verdict that 
reflected a finding that there were no such touchings or 
threats. And denying the jury that option does not comply with 
the weight of the authority of case law which prescribes that 
instructions on lessor included offenses must be given if there 
exists ~ evidence to support a conviction on the included 
- 10 -
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offense. 
Applying these rational and possible findings of facts, the 
jury could have returned verdicts convicting one or both 
Defendants of any of the following lessor included offenses which 
they were not instructed to consider at the time of trial: 
1. Aggravated assault by a prisoner a) threats or attempts 
to do bodily injury, b) use or threats of deadly force, c) 
Defendants were prisoners by statutory definition, d) but no 
sodomistic touching; 
2. Assault by a prisoner a) threats or attempts to do 
bodily injury, b) Defendants were prisoners by definition, c) but 
no use or threats of deadly force, and d) no sodomistic touching; 
3. Attempted forcible sodomy a) attempts at, but no 
fruition of sodomistic touching, b) attempts made without the 
victim's consent; 
4. Forcible sexual abuse a) no sodomistic touching nor 
attempts at sodomistic touching, b) but the taking of indecent 
liberties with the victim and an intent to cause substantial 
emotional or bodily pain to the victim, without the consent of 
the victim. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Case law from the Federal system, from this Court, and from 
other state Supreme Courts holds that a criminal defendant is 
entitled to have his jury instructed relevant to all lessor 
included offenses if there is any evidence to support a 
conviction on such lessor offense. The trial Court may omit such 
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instructions only if there is no evidence to support a conviction 
on an included offense. Defendants' entitlement to such 
instructions is fundamental to the preservation of their rights 
to due process. 
Because this right is so vital to the Defendants, the trial 
Court is obliged to see to it that the jury is instructed on the 
availability of convictions for lessor included offenses, if even 
on its own motion, notwithstanding Defendants' failure to request 
those instructions, and in spite of the opposition's objection to 
such instructions. Further, statutory and case law permit 
appellate review of the trial Court's omissions of such 
instructions even though Defendants did not adequately record 
objections thereto, because the right abridged is vital to 
Defendants, the penalties and loss of liberty are potentially 
severe, and the evidence supported instructions, on all lessor 
included offenses. 
Testimonial evidence introduced at the trial of Defendants 
establishes that there was much evidence that would have 
supported convictions on several lessor included offenses that 
were not offered to the jury. As a result, the jury was allowed 
to consider only one included offense--a 2nd degree felony--and 
was not allowed to consider four other included offenses--one 2nd 
degree felony and three 3rd degree felonies. 
It is likely that the jury--while convinced that "a" crime 
had been committed--returned guilty verdicts for forcible sodomy 
charges only because they had no other lessor included offenses 
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to choose from. Defendants were, therefore, denied due process 
of law and equal protection of the laws in violation of the 
Constitutions of both the United State and of Utah as well as 
Section 76-1-402 (4), U.C.A. (1953). 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the d~te below he 
mailed a copy of the above Appellants' Brief to DAVID L. 
WILKINSON, Attorney General, State of Utah, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, with all postal and other 
fees prepaid. 
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